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Five Months Later
(The Trial Court Opinion)
Richard Delgado*
Following our denial of defendants' motions for summary judgment,
we heard this case in November 1992. Despite the interest in judicial
efficiency and the concern we share with all courts over crowded dockets,
see Judicial Reform Act of 1990 § 103(a), 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 471-482 (West
Supp. 1992); Marc Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What We
Know and Don't Know (and Think We Know) About Our Allegedly Conten-
tious and Litigious Society, 31 UCLA L. REv. 4 (1983), this case struck
us as unsuitable for summary disposition. The issues that plaintiff, a
white male applicant for a law teaching position (now a professor) raises-
namely, the validity under the Equal Protection Clause and several federal
civil rights statutes of various commonly employed faculty appointments
procedures-are timely and important. Despite the initial doubts we enter-
tained about plaintiff's case, both procedurally and on the merits, we
concluded that summary disposition would have denied society a benefit-
namely, full airing of the numerous vexing and difficult questions of so-
called reverse discrimination that it presents. See Laurence H. Tribe,
Structural Due Process, 10 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 269, 303-10 (1975)
(urging full hearing of cases in areas of social flux). Moreover, legal and
factual issues that turn on questions of intent are rarely appropriate for
summary judgment. Cross v. United States, 336 F.2d 431, 433 (2d Cir.
1964); see also David A. Sonenshein, State of Mind and Credibility in the
Summary Judgment Context, 78 Nw. U. L. REv. 774, 786 (1983) (arguing
that the Supreme Court has "created a climate" in which summary judg-
ment is an inappropriate way to resolve cases turning on intent).
For similar reasons, we decided to hear this case despite serious
questions concerning plaintiff's standing to sue. See Supp. Order, Sept.
14, 1992, at 36. As became clear when the summary judgment motion
* Charles Inglis Thomson Professor of Law, University of Colorado. J.D. 1974, University of
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1. The earlier unreported opinion denying motions for summary judgment is reprinted in Michael
S. Paulsen, Reverse Discrimination and Law School Faculty Hiring: The Undiscovered Opinion, 71
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was heard, plaintiff did receive an appointment at a respected law school,
commencing the very year for which he sought appointment at the defen-
dant schools. There is no evidence in the record that his salary, teaching
duties, or perquisites are now worse than those he would have received had
he been successful in obtaining employment at defendant institutions. We
find that the school where plaintiff now teaches is a dominantly majority-
race institution, located in a north-central state, and with little record of
success in diversifying itself along ethnic, racial, or gender lines, while
defendant law schools, by contrast, have been making energetic efforts in
this direction. Plaintiff thus may well have been at more of a premium at
the school where he obtained employment, obtained superior perquisites
and treatment there, and, indeed, found an environment more congenial to
his social preferences. See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS:
THE CASE AGAINST EMPLOYMENT DIscRIMINATIoN (1992) (advocating
free-market solutions to matters of racial preference).
Because plaintiff has obtained a teaching position at least equivalent
to the one he sought at defendant schools, his standing in this case is thin.
Nevertheless, we decided to hear this matter. It is of considerable social
interest, as we mentioned, and the problem of balancing affirmative action
plans at the university level against charges of reverse discrimination is
likely to recur. Supp. Order at 4. Many of the law schools in this
jurisdiction will benefit from the guidelines we lay down and, if our
decision is appealed, from the case's disposition on appeal.
This was a bench trial. It spanned eight full days and generated a
transcript running over 2800 pages. The parties introduced testimony from
more than thirty witnesses, four experts, and one intervenor (hereinafter
Intervenor, or Intervenor Civil Rights Organization). The parties and
counsel conducted themselves in exemplary fashion, as we note in the
conclusion of this opinion. Following are the court's findings of fact and
conclusions of law.
I. Findings of Fact
As noted in our previous order denying motions for summary judg-
ment, plaintiff is a recently appointed white male law professor at a
prominent law school who pursued other interests before settling into an
academic career. Following graduation from law school, he obtained a
position as a trial attorney with the Department of Justice. Later, he
served as a staff attorney for a public interest organization, but returned to
the Justice Department after three years as an Attorney-Advisor. Intrigued
by the notion of pursuing a career in legal academia, plaintiff explored
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opportunities at several law schools, both private and public. After being
interviewed for positions at these schools, plaintiff learned that they
maintain a policy of setting aside certain positions to be filled by minority
candidates, if such candidates are available. He was denied a position.
Believing the procedures under which he had been considered violated the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, as well as Titles
VI and VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d to 2000d-4, 2000e
to 2000e-17 (1988), he brought suit in this court, asking for appropriate
relief.
At the trial, several significant pieces of information were presented
that were not apparent at the summary judgment stage. In particular, the
chairs of the appointments committees of defendant schools (hereinafter
Chairs) testified that plaintiff's qualifications for a law teaching position,
while strong enough to warrant initial consideration-to "get him in the
door," as one of them put it, Tr. at 129,-fell somewhat short of superstar-
dom. Plaintiff's main claim to entitlement to a law teaching position of his
choice seems to be that he went to a good law school and earned good
grades. He also served honorably in government service, but without any
particular distinction, so far as we could tell. He published two profes-
sional articles while in practice but seemingly nothing while in law school.
Nothing in the record indicates why he did not avail himself of the oppor-
tunity to publish a student Note or Comment during his tenure on his
school's law review. As one Chair testified, this struck some members of
the appointments committees as indicating a possible lack of commitment
to legal scholarship.
His letters of recommendation were solid, but not remarkable. Each
Chair testified that plaintiff simply did not make a case for such an
outstanding degree of legal creativity and imagination that one confidently
could predict an academic career of great distinction for him. Tr. at 237,
492-47, 1103. However, the Chairs added that plaintiff's background
indicated he would prove an adequate teacher of the law and its concepts.
Tr. at 238, 1103-05.
In short, he seems to have been one of many candidates of good, but
not stellar, credentials on the legal hiring market during the year in
question-a market that testimony indicated is flooded with an above-
average number of candidates, owing perhaps to the downturn in the
nation's economy and the tougher hiring measures many agencies and firms
have been instituting as a result. Tr. at 22, 373-76.
We also heard unrebutted testimony that some of the "hottest" topics
for law school teaching and scholarship-areas of greatest demand-are
ones in which plaintiff has little interest or experience. The Chairs testified
that feminist legal theory and various types of Critical Legal Studies, as
well as interdisciplinary studies such as law and economics, are currently
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in greatest demand on the hiring market. Tr. at 379-81, 383-86. Plaintiff
displayed only mild interest in any of these areas. Tr. at 384. Our respect
for institutional autonomy and academic freedom makes us highly reluctant
to impose our own judgments on the law schools concerned regarding the
areas in which they should do their hiring. See Keyishian v. Board of
Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967) (describing academia as a "marketplace
of ideas," which requires special protection against laws that "cast a pall
of orthodoxy over the classroom"); LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CON-
STITUTIONAL LAW 1318-21 (2d ed. 1988) (discussing the Supreme Court's
enduring hostility toward state attempts to prescribe school curricula and
educational materials). Indeed, we heard testimony that scholars of color
and women have been publishing in the top legal journals far beyond their
representation in the law professoriate generally. Tr. at 822(A) (citing
Richard Delgado, The Imperial Scholar Revisited: How to Marginalize
Outsider Writing, Ten Years Later, 140 U. PA. L. REv. 1349, 1352 n. 15
(1992) and Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Critical Race Theory: An
Annotated Bibliography, 79 VA. L. REv. 461 (1993)). This evidence,
showing the enormous amount of legal scholarship produced by minority
scholars, in addition to the testimony of the law school appointments Chairs
praising this work, persuades us that the institutions' practice of separating
applications into two piles may well have been for the benefit of candidates
like plaintiff-that is, may have been designed to assure that candidates like
him were not engulfed by the smaller numbers of these other candidates
with attractive or trendy qualifications.
We also heard testimony from Intervenor, as well as from four retired
professors or deans (hereinafter Retirees), concerning the law schools' past
complicity with formal local discrimination. Tr. at 111-13, 192-97. These
matters were not briefed or argued by the defendant institutions, for
obvious reasons. Yet neither they nor plaintiff rebutted any of this evi-
dence in any substantial way. That testimony included that each law school
had no, or very few, women students until about 1930, and no, or very
few, students of color until the early 1960s. Tr. at 111-12; see also
Michael A. Olivas, Legal Norms in Law School Admissions: An Essay on
Parallel Universes, 42 J. LEGAL EDUC. 103, 110-13 (1992) (chronicling
attempts by black students to gain admittance to traditionally white law
schools from 1940 to 1960). With respect to faculty positions, none of the
institutions had a female professor until 1930, except for one that had a
single female assistant dean who seems to have taught legal writing and
served as departmental secretary. Tr. at 111. We heard testimony about
informal practices and unspoken policies against hiring Jewish, id., female,
or African-American professors, Tr. at 111-12, and about segregated
dining and dormitory facilities, Tr. at 117; see also Olivas, supra, at 111-
12. We heard testimony about law faculty who wrote briefs, editorials,
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and law review articles opposing integration, civil rights legislation, and
even Brown v. Board of Education, Tr. at 116-18. See, e.g., Herbert
Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARv. L.
REv. 1, 22, 26-34 (1959) (criticizing the Supreme Court's reasoning in
cases striking down racially restrictive covenants and segregated schools).
We heard testimony of law reviews that as recently as 1899 were publish-
ing articles condoning the practice of lynching. Tr. at 117; see also
Randall L. Kennedy, Racial Critiques of Legal Academia, 102 HARv. L.
REv. 1745, 1753-54 & n.40 (1989) (citing Charles J. Bonaparte, Lynch
Law and Its Remedy, 8 YALE L.J. 335 (1899)). We heard testimony about
the service of prominent members of the law faculties on boards and
commissions engaged in perpetuating racial segregation in housing, busi-
ness, and other areas. Tr. at 136-40. This evidence easily reaches the
level required, either as a constitutional or statutory matter, to justify
remedial measures like the ones the law schools instituted, and which the
professional association encouraged, that are aimed at undoing the effects
of past discrimination. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438
U.S. 265, 369-78 (1978) (stating that a race-conscious medical school
admissions policy is permissible if designed to remedy the effects of past
racial discrimination).
Finally, we heard testimony and received documentary evidence that
the student body of a law school benefits from exposure to ideas and
viewpoints brought forth by women scholars and those of color. Tr. at
337-421. Law students of all descriptions gain from exposure to positive
role models, and are thereafter likely to be more sensitive to their diverse
clients' needs. Id. We also heard that when a faculty exemplifies diver-
sity, potential minority students are encouraged to pursue legal careers.
Tr. at 342-44; cf Linda S. Greene, Tokens, Role Models, and Pedagogical
Politics: Lamentations of an African American Female Law Professor, 6
BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 81, 88 (1990-91) (arguing that law schools may
attempt to encourage possibly reluctant minority students to enroll by
displaying minority professors as "role models"). A diverse faculty
facilitates a diverse student body, which, in turn, enables the legal
profession to serve the needs of an increasingly diverse population. Tr. at
345 (testimony of Chairs); Intervenor's Br. at 43.
In summary, we find that:
1. Plaintiff's credentials qualified him to teach law, but did not
place him at the top of the candidate pool.
2. Defendants' decision to emphasize consideration of candidates
with backgrounds and interests different from plaintiff's fell
within the scope of legitimate institutional authority.
3. The two-pile procedure of which plaintiff complains was a
response to these institutional needs and may well have been
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taken, in part, for the benefit of candidates like plaintiff.'
4. The law schools, like most, were complicit in past discrimination
against women and minority groups.
5. Minority students, women, and society at large benefit from a
diverse law professoriate.
II. Findings of Law
Based on the above factual findings, we conclude that neither the law
schools themselves nor their professional association violated Title VI, 42
U.S.C. §§ 2000d to 2000d-4 (1988), Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to
2000e-17 (1988), or the Equal Protection Clause of the United States
Constitution in their consideration of plaintiff. The appointments measures
taken by defendants were reasonably calculated to bring to the law schools
talented young scholars of diverse backgrounds likely to teach and write in
areas the law schools, for valid professional reasons, deemed as high
priority.
We find no evidence whatsoever of any intent to discriminate neces-
sary to maintain an action for relief, see Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S.
229, 239 (1976) (stating that a law or official act with a racially dispropor-
tionate impact is unconstitutional only if it also has a racially discrimina-
tory purpose), nor that the law schools' two-pile approach caused plaintiff
any discernible harm, because he has since obtained suitable employment
elsewhere. Finally, we give little weight to plaintiff's argument that
demographic diversity does not guarantee intellectual diversity. A
moment's reflection enables us to take notice that most law-and-economics
scholars are conservative Republicans; that most radical feminists are
women, not men; and that most Critical Race Theory exponents are men
and women of color. Law schools are not required to ignore what every-
one knows, namely that color, gender, and life experience sometimes
matter. See Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990)
(upholding an FCC determination that expanded minority ownership of
broadcasting outlets will result in greater broadcast diversity); Neil
Gotanda, A Critique of "Our Constitution Is Color-Blind," 44 STAN. L.
REv. 1, 63 (1991) ("[R]ace is a unique social formation with its own
meanings, understandings, and interpretive frameworks."). As one of our
most distinguished jurists recently noted:
But as I listened . . . to Justice Marshall talk eloquently ...
about the social stigmas and lost opportunities suffered by African
American children . . ., my awareness of race-based disparities
deepened.
Although all of us come to the Court with our own personal
histories and experiences, Justice Marshall brought a special
perspective. His was the eye of a lawyer who saw the deepest
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wounds in the social fabric. . . . His was the mouth of a man who
knew the anguish of the silenced ....
At oral arguments and conference meetings . . . Justice Mar-
shall imparted not only his legal acumen but also his life experiences,
constantly pushing and prodding us to respond... to the power of
moral truth.
Sandra Day O'Connor, Thurgood Marshall: The Influence of a Raconteur,
44 STAN. L. REv. 1217, 1217 (1992).
For the foregoing reasons, we find that no redressable wrong has been
committed. America has long been a melting pot, a nation in which
immigrants and ideas from all cultures have come together in a blend
richer than any one alone. The law schools, as well as their association,
acted on ideals as old as this nation, on core commitments integral to our
self-concept as a people.
Plaintiff, while not entitled to relief, has nevertheless served the nation
well by bringing these ideas to the fore. We are confident that he will now
apply his considerable legal and scholarly talents, amply displayed in his
briefs and motions, to analysis of the many pressing social problems that
confront this society and region. All counsel, expert witnesses, and
especially Intervenor, are commended for the professionalism and high
quality of their advocacy and participation. Defendants' motions for Rule
11 sanctions are denied. Plaintiff's suit, while lacking in merit, was not
frivolous or malintentioned.
We find for defendants on all counts.
1993] 1017

